Documentation Contents

Permissions in the Java™ SE 6 Development Kit (JDK)

A permission represents access to a system resource. In order for a resource access to be allowed for an applet (or an application running with a security manager), the corresponding permission must be explicitly granted to the code attempting the access.

A permission typically has a name (often referred to as a "target name") and, in some cases, a comma-separated list of one or more actions. For example, the following code creates a FilePermission object representing read access to the file named abc in the /tmp directory:

perm = new java.io.FilePermission("/tmp/abc", "read");

In this, the target name is "/tmp/abc" and the action string is "read".

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Important Note: The above statement creates a permission object. A permission object represents, but does not grant access to, a system resource. Permission objects are constructed and assigned ("granted") to code based on the policy in effect. When a permission object is assigned to some code, that code is granted the permission to access the system resource specified in the permission object, in the specified manner. A permission object may also be constructed by the current security manager when making access decisions. In this case, the (target) permission object is created based on the requested access, and checked against the permission objects granted to and held by the code making the request.

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The policy for a Java application environment is represented by a Policy object. In the Policy reference implementation, the policy can be specified within one or more policy configuration files. The policy file(s) specify what permissions are allowed for code from specified code sources. A sample policy file entry granting code from the /home/sysadmin directory read access to the file /tmp/abc is

grant codeBase "file:/home/sysadmin/" {
    permission java.io.FilePermission "/tmp/abc", "read";
};

For information about policy file locations and granting permissions in policy files, see Default Policy Implementation and Policy File Syntax. For information about using the Policy Tool to specify the permissions, see the Policy Tool documentation (for Solaris) (for Windows). Using the Policy Tool saves typing and eliminates the need for you to know the required syntax of policy files.

Technically, whenever a resource access is attempted, all code traversed by the execution thread up to that point must have permission for that resource access, unless some code on the thread has been marked as "privileged." See API for Privileged Blocks for more information about "privileged" code.

This document contains tables that describe the built-in JDK permission types and discuss the risks of granting each permission. It also contains tables showing the methods that require permissions to be in effect in order to be successful, and for each lists the required permission.

The tables are the following:

Permission Descriptions and Risks

java.security.AllPermission

java.security.SecurityPermission

java.security.UnresolvedPermission

java.awt.AWTPermission

java.io.FilePermission

java.io.SerializablePermission

java.lang.reflect.ReflectPermission

java.lang.RuntimePermission

• NIO-Related Targets

java.net.NetPermission

java.net.SocketPermission

java.sql.SQLPermission

java.util.PropertyPermission

java.util.logging.LoggingPermission

javax.net.ssl.SSLPermission

javax.security.auth.AuthPermission

javax.security.auth.PrivateCredentialPermission

javax.security.auth.kerberos.DelegationPermission

javax.security.auth.kerberos.ServicePermission

javax.sound.sampled.AudioPermission

Methods and the Permissions They Require

java.lang.SecurityManager Method Permission Checks

For more information about permissions, including the superclasses java.security.Permission and java.security.BasicPermission, and examples of creating permission objects and granting permissions, see the Security Architecture Specification.

Permission Descriptions and Risks

The following tables describe the built-in JDK permission types and discuss the risks of granting each permission.

AllPermission

The java.security.AllPermission is a permission that implies all other permissions.

Note: Granting AllPermission should be done with extreme care, as it implies all other permissions. Thus, it grants code the ability to run with security disabled. Extreme caution should be taken before granting such a permission to code. This permission should be used only during testing, or in extremely rare cases where an application or applet is completely trusted and adding the necessary permissions to the policy is prohibitively cumbersome.

SecurityPermission

A java.security.SecurityPermission is for security permissions. A SecurityPermission contains a name (also referred to as a "target name") but no actions list; you either have the named permission or you don't.

The target name is the name of a security configuration parameter (see below). Currently the SecurityPermission object is used to guard access to the Policy, Security, Provider, Signer, and Identity objects.

The following table lists all the possible SecurityPermission target names, and for each provides a description of what the permission allows and a discussion of the risks of granting code the permission.

java.security.SecurityPermission Target Name	What the Permission Allows	Risks of Allowing this Permission
createAccessControlContext	Creation of an AccessControlContext	This allows someone to instantiate an AccessControlContext with a DomainCombiner. Since DomainCombiners are given a reference to the ProtectionDomains currently on the stack, this could potentially lead to a privacy leak if the DomainCombiner is malicious.
getDomainCombiner	Retrieval of an AccessControlContext's DomainCombiner	This allows someone to query the policy via the getPermissions call, which discloses which permissions would be granted to a given CodeSource. While revealing the policy does not compromise the security of the system, it does provide malicious code with additional information which it may use to better aim an attack. It is wise not to divulge more information than necessary.
getPolicy	Retrieval of the system-wide security policy (specifically, of the currently-installed Policy object)	This allows someone to query the policy via the getPermissions call, which discloses which permissions would be granted to a given CodeSource. While revealing the policy does not compromise the security of the system, it does provide malicious code with additional information which it may use to better aim an attack. It is wise not to divulge more information than necessary.
setPolicy	Setting of the system-wide security policy (specifically, the Policy object)	Granting this permission is extremely dangerous, as malicious code may grant itself all the necessary permissions it needs to successfully mount an attack on the system.
createPolicy.{policy type}	Getting an instance of a Policy via Policy.getInstance	Granting this permission enables code to obtain a Policy object. Malicious code may query the Policy object to determine what permissions have been granted to code other than itself.
getProperty.{key}	Retrieval of the security property with the specified key	Depending on the particular key for which access has been granted, the code may have access to the list of security providers, as well as the location of the system-wide and user security policies. while revealing this information does not compromise the security of the system, it does provide malicious code with additional information which it may use to better aim an attack.
setProperty.{key}	Setting of the security property with the specified key	This could include setting a security provider or defining the location of the the system-wide security policy. Malicious code that has permission to set a new security provider may set a rogue provider that steals confidential information such as cryptographic private keys. In addition, malicious code with permission to set the location of the system-wide security policy may point it to a security policy that grants the attacker all the necessary permissions it requires to successfully mount an attack on the system.
insertProvider.{provider name}	Addition of a new provider, with the specified name	This would allow somebody to introduce a possibly malicious provider (e.g., one that discloses the private keys passed to it) as the highest-priority provider. This would be possible because the Security object (which manages the installed providers) currently does not check the integrity or authenticity of a provider before attaching it.
removeProvider.{provider name}	Removal of the specified provider	This may change the behavior or disable execution of other parts of the program. If a provider subsequently requested by the program has been removed, execution may fail. Also, if the removed provider is not explicitly requested by the rest of the program, but it would normally be the provider chosen when a cryptography service is requested (due to its previous order in the list of providers), a different provider will be chosen instead, or no suitable provider will be found, thereby resulting in program failure.
setSystemScope	Setting of the system identity scope	This would allow an attacker to configure the system identity scope with certificates that should not be trusted, thereby granting applet or application code signed with those certificates privileges that would have been denied by the system's original identity scope
setIdentityPublicKey	Setting of the public key for an Identity	If the identity is marked as "trusted", this allows an attacker to introduce a different public key (e.g., its own) that is not trusted by the system's identity scope, thereby granting applet or application code signed with that public key privileges that would have been denied otherwise.
setIdentityInfo	Setting of a general information string for an Identity	This allows attackers to set the general description for an identity. This may trick applications into using a different identity than intended or may prevent applications from finding a particular identity.
addIdentityCertificate	Addition of a certificate for an Identity	This allows attackers to set a certificate for an identity's public key. This is dangerous because it affects the trust relationship across the system. This public key suddenly becomes trusted to a wider audience than it otherwise would be.
removeIdentityCertificate	Removal of a certificate for an Identity	This allows attackers to remove a certificate for an identity's public key. This is dangerous because it affects the trust relationship across the system. This public key suddenly becomes considered less trustworthy than it otherwise would be.
printIdentity	Viewing the name of a principal and optionally the scope in which it is used, and whether or not it is considered "trusted" in that scope.	The scope that is printed out may be a filename, in which case it may convey local system information. For example, here's a sample printout of an identity named "carol", who is marked not trusted in the user's identity database: carol[/home/luehe/identitydb.obj][not trusted]
clearProviderProperties.{provider name}	"Clearing" of a Provider so that it no longer contains the properties used to look up services implemented by the provider	This disables the lookup of services implemented by the provider. This may thus change the behavior or disable execution of other parts of the program that would normally utilize the Provider, as described under the "removeProvider.{provider name}" permission.
putProviderProperty.{provider name}	Setting of properties for the specified Provider	The provider properties each specify the name and location of a particular service implemented by the provider. By granting this permission, you let code replace the service specification with another one, thereby specifying a different implementation.
removeProviderProperty.{provider name}	Removal of properties from the specified Provider	This disables the lookup of services implemented by the provider. They are no longer accessible due to removal of the properties specifying their names and locations. This may change the behavior or disable execution of other parts of the program that would normally utilize the Provider, as described under the "removeProvider.{provider name}" permission.
getSignerPrivateKey	Retrieval of a Signer's private key	It is very dangerous to allow access to a private key; private keys are supposed to be kept secret. Otherwise, code can use the private key to sign various files and claim the signature came from the Signer.
setSignerKeyPair	Setting of the key pair (public key and private key) for a Signer	This would allow an attacker to replace somebody else's (the "target's") keypair with a possibly weaker keypair (e.g., a keypair of a smaller keysize). This also would allow the attacker to listen in on encrypted communication between the target and its peers. The target's peers might wrap an encryption session key under the target's "new" public key, which would allow the attacker (who possesses the corresponding private key) to unwrap the session key and decipher the communication data encrypted under that session key.

UnresolvedPermission

The java.security.UnresolvedPermission class is used to hold Permissions that were "unresolved" when the Policy was initialized. An unresolved permission is one whose actual Permission class does not yet exist at the time the Policy is initialized (see below).

The policy for a Java runtime (specifying which permissions are available for code from various principals) is represented by a Policy object. Whenever a Policy is initialized or refreshed, Permission objects of appropriate classes are created for all permissions allowed by the Policy.

Many permission class types referenced by the policy configuration are ones that exist locally (i.e., ones that can be found on CLASSPATH). Objects for such permissions can be instantiated during Policy initialization. For example, it is always possible to instantiate a java.io.FilePermission, since the FilePermission class is found on the CLASSPATH.

Other permission classes may not yet exist during Policy initialization. For example, a referenced permission class may be in a JAR file that will later be loaded. For each such class, an UnresolvedPermission is instantiated. Thus, an UnresolvedPermission is essentially a "placeholder" containing information about the permission.

Later, when code calls AccessController.checkPermission on a permission of a type that was previously unresolved, but whose class has since been loaded, previously-unresolved permissions of that type are "resolved". That is, for each such UnresolvedPermission, a new object of the appropriate class type is instantiated, based on the information in the UnresolvedPermission. This new object replaces the UnresolvedPermission, which is removed.

AWTPermission

A java.awt.AWTPermission is for AWT permissions.

The following table lists all the possible AWTPermission target names, and for each provides a description of what the permission allows and a discussion of the risks of granting code the permission.

java.awt.AWTPermission Target Name	What the Permission Allows	Risks of Allowing this Permission
accessClipboard	Posting and retrieval of information to and from the AWT clipboard	This would allow malfeasant code to share potentially sensitive or confidential information.
accessEventQueue	Access to the AWT event queue	After retrieving the AWT event queue, malicious code may peek at and even remove existing events from the system, as well as post bogus events which may purposefully cause the application or applet to misbehave in an insecure manner.
createRobot	Create java.awt.Robot objects	The java.awt.Robot object allows code to generate native-level mouse and keyboard events as well as read the screen. It could allow malicious code to control the system, run other programs, read the display, and deny mouse and keyboard access to the user.
listenToAllAWTEvents	Listen to all AWT events, system-wide	After adding an AWT event listener, malicious code may scan all AWT events dispatched in the system, allowing it to read all user input (such as passwords). Each AWT event listener is called from within the context of that event queue's EventDispatchThread, so if the accessEventQueue permission is also enabled, malicious code could modify the contents of AWT event queues system-wide, causing the application or applet to misbehave in an insecure manner.
readDisplayPixels	Readback of pixels from the display screen	Interfaces such as the java.awt.Composite interface which allow arbitrary code to examine pixels on the display enable malicious code to snoop on the activities of the user.
showWindowWithoutWarningBanner	Display of a window without also displaying a banner warning that the window was created by an applet	Without this warning, an applet may pop up windows without the user knowing that they belong to an applet. Since users may make security-sensitive decisions based on whether or not the window belongs to an applet (entering a username and password into a dialog box, for example), disabling this warning banner may allow applets to trick the user into entering such information.

FilePermission

A java.io.FilePermission represents access to a file or directory. A FilePermission consists of a pathname and a set of actions valid for that pathname.

Pathname is the pathname of the file or directory granted the specified actions. A pathname that ends in "/*" (where "/" is the file separator character, File.separatorChar) indicates a directory and all the files contained in that directory. A pathname that ends with "/-" indicates a directory and (recursively) all files and subdirectories contained in that directory. A pathname consisting of the special token "<<ALL FILES>>" matches any file.

A pathname consisting of a single "*" indicates all the files in the current directory, while a pathname consisting of a single "-" indicates all the files in the current directory and (recursively) all files and subdirectories contained in the current directory.

The actions to be granted are passed to the constructor in a string containing a list of zero or more comma-separated keywords. The possible keywords are "read", "write", "execute", and "delete". Their meaning is defined as follows:

read	Permission to read.
write	Permission to write (which includes permission to create).
execute	Permission to execute. Allows Runtime.exec to be called. Corresponds to SecurityManager.checkExec.
delete	Permission to delete. Allows File.delete to be called. Corresponds to SecurityManager.checkDelete.

The actions string is converted to lowercase before processing.

Be careful when granting FilePermissions. Think about the implications of granting read and especially write access to various files and directories. The "<<ALL FILES>>" permission with write action is especially dangerous. This grants permission to write to the entire file system. One thing this effectively allows is replacement of the system binary, including the JVM runtime environment.

Note: code can always read a file from the same directory it's in (or a subdirectory of that directory); it does not need explicit permission to do so.

SerializablePermission

A java.io.SerializablePermission is for serializable permissions. A SerializablePermission contains a name (also referred to as a "target name") but no actions list; you either have the named permission or you don't.

The target name is the name of the Serializable permission (see below).

The following table lists all the possible SerializablePermission target names, and for each provides a description of what the permission allows and a discussion of the risks of granting code the permission.

java.io.SerializablePermission Target Name	What the Permission Allows	Risks of Allowing this Permission
enableSubclassImplementation	Implementing a subclass of ObjectOutputStream or ObjectInputStream to override the default serialization or deserialization, respectively, of objects	Code can use this to serialize or deserialize classes in a purposefully malfeasant manner. For example, during serialization, malicious code can use this to purposefully store confidential private field data in a way easily accessible to attackers. Or, during deserializaiton it could, for example, deserialize a class with all its private fields zeroed out.
enableSubstitution	Substitution of one object for another during serialization or deserialization	This is dangerous because malicious code can replace the actual object with one which has incorrect or malignant data.

ReflectPermission

A java.lang.reflect.ReflectPermission is for reflective operations. A ReflectPermission is a named permission and has no actions. The only name currently defined is suppressAccessChecks, which allows suppressing the standard language access checks -- for public, default (package) access, protected, and private members -- performed by reflected objects at their point of use.

The following table provides a summary description of what the permission allows, and discusses the risks of granting code the permission.

java.lang.reflect.ReflectPermission Target Name	What the Permission Allows	Risks of Allowing this Permission
suppressAccessChecks	Warning: Extreme caution should be taken before granting this permission to code, for it provides the ability to access fields and invoke methods in a class. This includes not only public, but protected and private fields and methods as well.	This is dangerous in that information (possibly confidential) and methods normally unavailable would be accessible to malicious code.

RuntimePermission

A java.lang.RuntimePermission is for runtime permissions. A RuntimePermission contains a name (also referred to as a "target name") but no actions list; you either have the named permission or you don't.

The target name is the name of the runtime permission (see below). The naming convention follows the hierarchical property naming convention. Also, an asterisk may appear at the end of the name, following a ".", or by itself, to signify a wildcard match. For example: "loadLibrary.*" or "*" is valid, "*loadLibrary" or "a*b" is not valid.

The following table lists all the possible RuntimePermission target names, and for each provides a description of what the permission allows and a discussion of the risks of granting code the permission.

java.lang.RuntimePermission Target Name	What the Permission Allows	Risks of Allowing this Permission
createClassLoader	Creation of a class loader	This is an extremely dangerous permission to grant. Malicious applications that can instantiate their own class loaders could then load their own rogue classes into the system. These newly loaded classes could be placed into any protection domain by the class loader, thereby automatically granting the classes the permissions for that domain.
getClassLoader	Retrieval of a class loader (e.g., the class loader for the calling class)	This would grant an attacker permission to get the class loader for a particular class. This is dangerous because having access to a class's class loader allows the attacker to load other classes available to that class loader. The attacker would typically otherwise not have access to those classes.
setContextClassLoader	Setting of the context class loader used by a thread	The context class loader is used by system code and extensions when they need to lookup resources that might not exist in the system class loader. Granting setContextClassLoader permission would allow code to change which context class loader is used for a particular thread, including system threads.
setSecurityManager	Setting of the security manager (possibly replacing an existing one)	The security manager is a class that allows applications to implement a security policy. Granting the setSecurityManager permission would allow code to change which security manager is used by installing a different, possibly less restrictive security manager, thereby bypassing checks that would have been enforced by the original security manager.
createSecurityManager	Creation of a new security manager	This gives code access to protected, sensitive methods that may disclose information about other classes or the execution stack.
exitVM.{exit status}	Halting of the Java Virtual Machine with the specified exit status	This allows an attacker to mount a denial-of-service attack by automatically forcing the virtual machine to halt.
shutdownHooks	Registration and cancellation of virtual-machine shutdown hooks	This allows an attacker to register a malicious shutdown hook that interferes with the clean shutdown of the virtual machine.
setFactory	Setting of the socket factory used by ServerSocket or Socket, or of the stream handler factory used by URL	This allows code to set the actual implementation for the socket, server socket, stream handler, or RMI socket factory. An attacker may set a faulty implementation which mangles the data stream.
setIO	Setting of System.out, System.in, and System.err	This allows changing the value of the standard system streams. An attacker may change System.in to monitor and steal user input, or may set System.err to a "null" OutputSteam, which would hide any error messages sent to System.err.
modifyThread	modification of threads, e.g., via calls to Thread >stop, suspend, resume, setPriority, and setName methods	This allows an attacker to start or suspend any thread in the system.
stopThread	Stopping of threads via calls to the Thread stop method	This allows code to stop any thread in the system provided that it is already granted permission to access that thread. This poses as a threat, because that code may corrupt the system by killing existing threads.
modifyThreadGroup	Creation or modification of thread groups (adding a thread to a thread group during thread creation or calling the ThreadGroup destroy, resume, setDaemon, setMaxPriority, stop, and suspend methods)	This allows an attacker to create threads in thread groups or to create and modify thread groups (setting their run priority, for example).
getProtectionDomain	Retrieval of the ProtectionDomain for a class	This allows code to obtain policy information for a particular code source. While obtaining policy information does not compromise the security of the system, it does give attackers additional information, such as local file names for example, to better aim an attack.
readFileDescriptor	Reading of file descriptors	This would allow code to read the particular file associated with the file descriptor read. This is dangerous if the file contains confidential data.
writeFileDescriptor	Writing to file descriptors	This allows code to write to a particular file associated with the descriptor. This is dangerous because it may allow malicous code to plant viruses or at the very least, fill up your entire disk.
loadLibrary.{library name}	Dynamic linking of the specified library	It is dangerous to allow an applet permission to load native code libraries, because the Java security architecture is not designed to and does not prevent malicious behavior at the level of native code.
accessClassInPackage. {package name}	Access to the specified package via a class loader's loadClass method when that class loader calls the SecurityManager checkPackageAcesss method	This gives code access to classes in packages to which it normally does not have access. Malicious code may use these classes to help in its attempt to compromise security in the system.
defineClassInPackage. {package name}	Definition of classes in the specified package, via a class loader's defineClass method when that class loader calls the SecurityManager checkPackageDefinition method.	This grants code permission to define a class in a particular package. This is dangerous because malicious code with this permission may define rogue classes in trusted packages like java.security or java.lang, for example.
accessDeclaredMembers	Warning: Extreme caution should be taken before granting this permission to code, for it provides access to the declared members of a class.	This grants code permission to query a class for its public, protected, default (package) access, and private fields and/or methods. Although the code would have access to the private and protected field and method names, it would not have access to the private/protected field data and would not be able to invoke any private methods. Nevertheless, malicious code may use this information to better aim an attack. Additionally, it may invoke any public methods and/or access public fields in the class. This could be dangerous if the code would normally not be able to invoke those methods and/or access the fields because it can't cast the object to the class/interface with those methods and fields.
queuePrintJob	Initiation of a print job request	This could print sensitive information to a printer, or simply waste paper.

NIO-Related Targets

Two NIO-related RuntimePermission targets were added in the 1.4 release of the Java 2 SDK:

selectorProvider
charsetProvider

These RuntimePermissions are required to be granted to classes which subclass and implement java.nio.channel.spi.SelectorProvider or java.nio.charset.spi.CharsetProvider. The permission is checked during invocation of the abstract base class constructor. These permissions ensure trust in classes which implement these security-sensitive provider mechanisms.

See java.nio.channels.spi.SelectorProvider and java.nio.channels.spi.CharsetProvider for more information.

NetPermission

A java.net.NetPermission is for various network permissions. A NetPermission contains a name but no actions list; you either have the named permission or you don't.

The following table lists all the possible NetPermission target names, and for each provides a description of what the permission allows and a discussion of the risks of granting code the permission.

java.net.NetPermission Target Name	What the Permission Allows	Risks of Allowing this Permission
setDefaultAuthenticator	The ability to set the way authentication information is retrieved when a proxy or HTTP server asks for authentication	Malicious code can set an authenticator that monitors and steals user authentication input as it retrieves the input from the user.
requestPasswordAuthentication	The ability to ask the authenticator registered with the system for a password	Malicious code may steal this password.
specifyStreamHandler	The ability to specify a stream handler when constructing a URL	Malicious code may create a URL with resources that it would normally not have access to (like file:/foo/fum/), specifying a stream handler that gets the actual bytes from someplace it does have access to. Thus it might be able to trick the system into creating a ProtectionDomain/CodeSource for a class even though that class really didn't come from that location.

SocketPermission

A java.net.SocketPermission represents access to a network via sockets. A SocketPermission consists of a host specification and a set of "actions" specifying ways to connect to that host. The host is specified as

host = (hostname | IPaddress)[:portrange]
portrange = portnumber | -portnumber | portnumber-[portnumber]

The host is expressed as a DNS name, as a numerical IP address, or as "localhost" (for the local machine). The wildcard "*" may be included once in a DNS name host specification. If it is included, it must be in the leftmost position, as in "*.sun.com".

The port or portrange is optional. A port specification of the form "N-", where N is a port number, signifies all ports numbered N and above, while a specification of the form "-N" indicates all ports numbered N and below.

The possible ways to connect to the host are

accept
connect
listen
resolve

The "listen" action is only meaningful when used with "localhost". The "resolve" (resolve host/ip name service lookups) action is implied when any of the other actions are present.

As an example of the creation and meaning of SocketPermissions, note that if you have the following entry in your policy file:

grant signedBy "mrm" {
    permission java.net.SocketPermission "puffin.eng.sun.com:7777", "connect, accept";
};

this causes the following permission object to be generated and granted to code signed by "mrm."

p1 = new SocketPermission("puffin.eng.sun.com:7777", "connect,accept");

p1 represents a permission allowing connections to port 7777 on puffin.eng.sun.com, and also accepting connections on that port.

Similarly, if you have the following entry in your policy:

grant signedBy "paul" {
    permission java.net.SocketPermission "localhost:1024-", "accept, connect, listen";
};

this causes the following permission object to be generated and granted to code signed by "paul."

p2 = new SocketPermission("localhost:1024-", "accept,connect,listen");

p2 represents a permission allowing accepting connections on, connecting to, or listening on any port between 1024 and 65535 on the local host.

Note: Granting code permission to accept or make connections to remote hosts may be dangerous because malevolent code can then more easily transfer and share confidential data among parties who may not otherwise have access to the data.

SQLPermission

The permission for which the SecurityManager will check when code that is running in an applet calls one of the setLogWriter methods. These methods include those in the following list.

• DriverManager.setLogWriter
  
• DriverManager.setLogStream (deprecated)
  
• javax.sql.DataSource.setLogWriter

• javax.sql.ConnectionPoolDataSource.setLogWriter

• javax.sql.XADataSource.setLogWriter


If there is no SQLPermission object, this method throws a java.lang.SecurityException as a runtime exception.

A SQLPermission object contains a name (also referred to as a "target name") but no actions list; there is either a named permission or there is not. The target name is the name of the permission (see below). The naming convention follows the hierarchical property naming convention. In addition, an asterisk may appear at the end of the name, following a ".", or by itself, to signify a wildcard match. For example: loadLibrary.* or * is valid, but *loadLibrary or a*b is not valid.

The following table lists all the possible SQLPermission target names. Currently, the only name allowed is setLog. The table gives a description of what the permission allows and a discussion of the risks of granting code the permission.

Permission Target Name	What the Permission Allows	Risks of Allowing this Permission
setLog	Setting of the logging stream	This is a dangerous permission to grant. The contents of the log may contain usernames and passwords, SQL statements, and SQL data.

The person running an applet decides what permissions to allow and will run the Policy Tool to create an SQLPermission in a policy file. A programmer does not use a constructor directly to create an instance of SQLPermission but rather uses a tool.

PropertyPermission

A java.util.PropertyPermission is for property permissions.

The name is the name of the property ("java.home", "os.name", etc). The naming convention follows the hierarchical property naming convention. Also, an asterisk may appear at the end of the name, following a ".", or by itself, to signify a wildcard match. For example: "java.*" or "*" is valid, "*java" or "a*b" is not valid.

The actions to be granted are passed to the constructor in a string containing a list of zero or more comma-separated keywords. The possible keywords are "read" and "write". Their meaning is defined as follows:

read	Permission to read. Allows System.getProperty to be called.
write	Permission to write. Allows System.setProperty to be called.

The actions string is converted to lowercase before processing.

Care should be taken before granting code permission to access certain system properties. For example, granting permission to access the "java.home" system property gives potentially malevolent code sensitive information about the system environment (the location of the runtime environment's directory). Also, granting permission to access the "user.name" and "user.home" system properties gives potentially malevolent code sensitive information about the user environment (the user's account name and home directory).

LoggingPermission

A SecurityManager will check the java.util.logging.LoggingPermission object when code running with a SecurityManager calls one of the logging control methods (such as Logger.setLevel).

Currently there is only one named LoggingPermission, "control". control grants the ability to control the logging configuration; for example by adding or removing Handlers, by adding or removing Filters, or by changing logging levels.

Normally you do not create LoggingPermission objects directly; instead they are created by the security policy code based on reading the security policy file.

SSLPermission

The javax.net.ssl.SSLPermission class is for various network permissions. An SSLPermission contains a name (also referred to as a "target name") but no actions list; you either have the named permission or you don't.

The target name is the name of the network permission (see below). The naming convention follows the hierarchical property naming convention. Also, an asterisk may appear at the end of the name, following a ".", or by itself, to signify a wildcard match. For example: "foo.*" or "*" is valid, "*foo" or "a*b" is not valid.

The following table lists all the possible SSLPermission target names, and for each provides a description of what the permission allows and a discussion of the risks of granting code the permission.

Permission Target Name	What the Permission Allows	Risks of Allowing this Permission
setHostnameVerifier	The ability to set a callback which can decide whether to allow a mismatch between the host being connected to by an HttpsURLConnection and the common name field in server certificate.	Malicious code can set a verifier that monitors host names visited by HttpsURLConnection requests or that allows server certificates with invalid common names.
getSSLSessionContext	The ability to get the SSLSessionContext of an SSLSession.	Malicious code may monitor sessions which have been established with SSL peers or might invalidate sessions to slow down performance.
setDefaultSSLContext	The ability to set the default SSL context.	When applications use default SSLContext, by setting the default SSL context, malicious code may use unproved trust material, key material and random generator, or use dangerous SSL socket factory and SSL server socket factory.

AuthPermission

The javax.security.auth.AuthPermission class is for authentication permissions. An AuthPermission contains a name (also referred to as a "target name") but no actions list; you either have the named permission or you don't.

Currently the AuthPermission object is used to guard access to the Subject, SubjectDomainCombiner, LoginContext and Configuration objects.

The following table lists all the possible AuthPermission target names, and for each provides a description of what the permission allows and a discussion of the risks of granting code the permission.

Permission Target Name	What the Permission Allows	Risks of Allowing this Permission
doAs	Invocation of the Subject.doAs methods	This enables an application to invoke code (Actions) under the identity of any Subject specified to the doAs method.
doAsPrivileged	Invocation of the Subject.doAsPrivileged methods	This enables an application to invoke code (Actions) under the identity of any Subject specified to the doAsPrivileged method. Additionally, the caller may remove itself from the call stack (and hence from subsequent security decisions) if it passes null as the AccessControlContext.
getSubject	Retrieving the Subject from the provided AccessControlContext	This permits an application to gain access to an authenticated Subject. The application can then access the Subject's authenticated Principals and public credentials.
getSubjectFromDomainCombiner	Retrieving the Subject from a SubjectDomainCombiner	This permits an application to gain access to the authenticated Subject associated with a SubjectDomainCombiner. The application can then access the Subject's authenticated Principals and public credentials.
setReadOnly	Setting a Subject read-only	This permits an application to set a Subject's Principal, public credential and private credential sets to be read-only. This can be potentially used as a type of denial of service attack.
modifyPrincipals	Make modifications to a Subject's Principal set	Access control decisions are based on the Principals associated with a Subject. This permission permits an application to make any modifications to a Subject's Principal set, thereby affecting subsequent security decisions.
modifyPublicCredentials	Make modifications to a Subject's public credential set	This permission permits an application to add or remove public credentials from a Subject. This may affect code that relies on the proper set of private credentials to exist in that Subject.
modifyPrivateCredentials	Make modifications to a Subject's private credential set	This permission permits an application to add or remove private credentials from a Subject. This may affect code that relies on the proper set of private credentials to exist in that Subject.
refreshCredential	Refresh a credential Object that implements the Refreshable interface	This permission permits an application to refresh a credential that is intended to expire.
destroyCredential	Destroy a credential Object that implements the Destroyable interface	This permission permits an application to potentially destroy a credential as a denial of service attack.
createLoginContext.{name}	Instantiate a LoginContext with the specified name	For security purposes, an administrator might not want an application to be able to authenticate to any LoginModule. This permission permits an application to authenticate to the LoginModules configured for the specified name.
getLoginConfiguration	Retrieve the system-wide login Configuration	Allows an application to determine all the LoginModules that are configured for every application in the system.
getLoginConfiguration	Retrieve the system-wide login Configuration	Allows an application to determine all the LoginModules that are configured for every application in the system.
setLoginConfiguration	Set the system-wide login Configuration	Allows an application to configure the LoginModules for every application in the system.
createLoginConfiguration.{configuration type}	Obtain a Configuration object via Configuration.getInstance	Allows an application to see all the LoginModules that are specified in the configuration.
refreshLoginConfiguration	Refresh the system-wide login Configuration	Allows an application to refresh the login Configuration.

PrivateCredentialPermission

The javax.security.auth.PrivateCredentialPermission class is used to protect access to private Credentials belonging to a particular Subject. The Subject is represented by a Set of Principals.

The target name of this Permission specifies a Credential class name, and a Set of Principals. The only valid value for this Permission's actions is, "read". The target name must abide by the following syntax:

CredentialClass {PrincipalClass "PrincipalName"}*

For example, the following permission grants access to the com.sun.PrivateCredential owned by Subjects which have a com.sun.Principal with the name, "duke".

Note: Although this example, as well as all the examples below, do not contain Codebase, SignedBy, or Principal information in the grant statement (for simplicity reasons), actual policy configurations should specify that information when appropriate.

grant {
    permission javax.security.auth.PrivateCredentialPermission
             "com.sun.PrivateCredential com.sun.Principal \"duke\"",
             "read";
};

If CredentialClass is "*", then access is granted to all private Credentials belonging to the specified Subject. If "PrincipalName" is "*", then access is granted to the specified Credential owned by any Subject that has the specified Principal (the actual PrincipalName doesn't matter). For example, the following grants access to the a.b.Credential owned by any Subject that has an a.b.Principal.

grant {
    permission javax.security.auth.PrivateCredentialPermission
             "a.b.Credential a.b.Principal "*"",
             "read";
};

If both the PrincipalClass and "PrincipalName" are "*", then access is granted to the specified Credential owned by any Subject. In addition, the PrincipalClass/PrincipalName pairing may be repeated:

grant {
    permission javax.security.auth.PrivateCredentialPermission
             "a.b.Credential a.b.Principal "duke" c.d.Principal "dukette"",
             "read";
};

The above code grants access to the private Credential, "a.b.Credential", belonging to a Subject with at least two associated Principals: "a.b.Principal" with the name, "duke", and "c.d.Principal", with the name, "dukette".

DelegationPermission

The javax.security.auth.kerberos.DelegationPermission class is used to restrict the usage of the Kerberos delegation model; ie, forwardable and proxiable tickets.

The target name of this Permission specifies a pair of kerberos service principals. The first is the subordinate service principal being entrusted to use the Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). The second service principal designates the target service the subordinate service principal is to interact with on behalf of the initiating KerberosPrincipal. This latter service principal is specified to restrict the use of a proxiable ticket.

For example, to specify the "host" service use of a forwardable TGT, the target permission is specified as follows:

DelegationPermission("\"host/foo.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM\" \"krbtgt/EXAMPLE.COM@EXAMPLE.COM\"");

To give the "backup" service a proxiable NFS service ticket, the target permission might be specified:

DelegationPermission("\"backup/bar.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM\" \"nfs/home.EXAMPLE.COM@EXAMPLE.COM\"");

ServicePermission

The javax.security.auth.kerberos.ServicePermission class is used to protect Kerberos services and the credentials necessary to access those services. There is a one to one mapping of a service principal and the credentials necessary to access the service. Therefore granting access to a service principal implicitly grants access to the credential necessary to establish a security context with the service principal. This applies regardless of whether the credentials are in a cache or acquired via an exchange with the KDC. The credential can be either a ticket granting ticket, a service ticket or a secret key from a key table.

A ServicePermission contains a service principal name and a list of actions which specify the context the credential can be used within.

The service principal name is the canonical name of the KereberosPrincipal supplying the service, that is the KerberosPrincipal represents a Kerberos service principal. This name is treated in a case sensitive manner.

Granting this permission implies that the caller can use a cached credential (Ticket Granting Ticket, service ticket or secret key) within the context designated by the action. In the case of the TGT, granting this permission also implies that the TGT can be obtained by an Authentication Service exchange.

The possible actions are:

initiate	Allows the caller to use the credential to initiate a security context with a service principal.
accept	Allows the caller to use the credential to accept security context as a particular principal.

For example, to specify the permission to access to the TGT to initiate a security context the permission is constructed as follows:

     ServicePermission("krbtgt/EXAMPLE.COM@EXAMPLE.COM", "initiate");

To obtain a service ticket to initiate a context with the "host" service the permission is constructed as follows:

ServicePermission("host/foo.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM", "initiate");

For a Kerberized server the action is "accept". For example, the permission necessary to access and use the secret key of the Kerberized "host" service (telnet and the likes) would be constructed as follows:

ServicePermission("host/foo.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM", "accept");

AudioPermission

The AudioPermission class represents access rights to the audio system resources. An AudioPermission contains a target name but no actions list; you either have the named permission or you don't.

The target name is the name of the audio permission (see the table below). The names follow the hierarchical property-naming convention. Also, an asterisk can be used to represent all the audio permissions.

The following table lists the possible AudioPermission target names. For each name, the table provides a description of exactly what that permission allows, as well as a discussion of the risks of granting code the permission.

Permission Target Name	What the Permission Allows	Risks of Allowing this Permission
play	Audio playback through the audio device or devices on the system. Allows the application to obtain and manipulate lines and mixers for audio playback (rendering).	In some cases use of this permission may affect other applications because the audio from one line may be mixed with other audio being played on the system, or because manipulation of a mixer affects the audio for all lines using that mixer.
record	Audio recording through the audio device or devices on the system. Allows the application to obtain and manipulate lines and mixers for audio recording (capture).	In some cases use of this permission may affect other applications because manipulation of a mixer affects the audio for all lines using that mixer. This permission can enable an applet or application to eavesdrop on a user.

Methods and the Permissions They Require

The following table contains a list of all the methods that require permissions, and for each tells which SecurityManager method it calls and which permission is checked for by the default implementation of that SecurityManager method.

Thus, with the default SecurityManager method implementations, a call to a method in the left-hand column can only be successful if the permission specified in the corresponding entry in the right-hand column is allowed by the policy currently in effect. For example, the following row:

Method	SecurityManager Method Called	Permission
java.awt.Toolkit getSystemEventQueue();	checkAwtEventQueueAccess	java.awt.AWTPermission "accessEventQueue";

specifies that a call to the getSystemEventQueue method in the java.awt.Toolkit class results in a call to the checkAwtEventQueueAccess SecurityManager method, which can only be successful if the following permission is granted to code on the call stack:

  java.awt.AWTPermission "accessEventQueue";

The convention of:

Method	SecurityManager Method Called	Permission
some.package.class public static void someMethod(String foo);	checkXXX	SomePermission "{foo}";

means the runtime value of foo replaces the string {foo} in the permission name.

As an example, here is one table entry:

Method	SecurityManager Method Called	Permission
java.io.FileInputStream FileInputStream(String name)	checkRead(String)	java.io.FilePermission "{name}", "read";

If the FileInputStream method (in this case, a constructor) is called with "/test/MyTestFile" as the name argument, as in

  FileInputStream("/test/MyTestFile");

then in order for the call to succeed, the following permission must be set in the current policy, allowing read access to the file "/test/MyTestFile":

  java.io.FilePermission "/test/MyTestFile", "read";

More specifically, the permission must either be explicitly set, as above, or implied by another permission, such as the following:

  java.io.FilePermission "/test/*", "read";

which allows read access to any files in the "/test" directory.

In some cases, a term in braces is not exactly the same as the name of a specific method argument but is meant to represent the relevant value. Here is an example:

Method	SecurityManager Method Called	Permission
java.net.DatagramSocket public synchronized void receive(DatagramPacket p);	checkAccept({host}, {port})	java.net.SocketPermission "{host}:{port}", "accept";

Here, the appropriate host and port values are calculated by the receive method and passed to checkAccept.

In most cases, just the name of the SecurityManager method called is listed. Where the method is one of multiple methods of the same name, the argument types are also listed, for example for checkRead(String) and checkRead(FileDescriptor). In other cases where arguments may be relevant, they are also listed.

The following table is ordered by package name. That is, the methods in classes in the java.awt package are listed first, followed by methods in classes in the java.io package, and so on.

java.awt.Graphics2d
  public abstract void 
    setComposite(Composite comp)

java.awt.Robot
  public Robot()
  public Robot(GraphicsDevice screen)

java.awt.Toolkit
  public void addAWTEventListener(
          AWTEventListener listener, 
          long eventMask)
  public void removeAWTEventListener(
     AWTEventListener listener)

java.awt.Toolkit
  public abstract PrintJob getPrintJob(
           Frame frame, String jobtitle,
           Properties props)

java.awt.Toolkit
  public abstract Clipboard 
                    getSystemClipboard()

java.awt.Toolkit
  public final EventQueue 
               getSystemEventQueue()

java.awt.Window
  Window()

java.beans.Beans
  public static void setDesignTime(
                 boolean isDesignTime)
  public static void setGuiAvailable(
                 boolean isGuiAvailable)

java.beans.Introspector
  public static synchronized void 
    setBeanInfoSearchPath(String path[])

java.beans.PropertyEditorManager
  public static void registerEditor(
                 Class targetType, 
                 Class editorClass)
  public static synchronized void 
    setEditorSearchPath(String path[])

java.io.File
  public boolean delete()
  public void deleteOnExit()

java.io.FileInputStream
  FileInputStream(FileDescriptor fdObj)

java.io.FileInputStream
  FileInputStream(String name)
  FileInputStream(File file)

java.io.File
  public boolean exists()
  public boolean canRead()
  public boolean isFile()
  public boolean isDirectory()
  public boolean isHidden()
  public long lastModified()
  public long length()
  public String[] list()
  public String[] list(
           FilenameFilter filter)
  public File[] listFiles()
  public File[] listFiles(
           FilenameFilter filter)
  public File[] listFiles(
           FileFilter filter)
      
java.io.RandomAccessFile
  RandomAccessFile(String name, String mode)
  RandomAccessFile(File file, String mode)
      (where mode is "r" in both of these)

java.io.FileOutputStream
  FileOutputStream(FileDescriptor fdObj)

java.io.FileOutputStream 
  FileOutputStream(File file)
  FileOutputStream(String name)
  FileOutputStream(String name, 
                   boolean append)

java.io.File
  public boolean canWrite()
  public boolean createNewFile()
  public static File createTempFile(
          String prefix, String suffix)
  public static File createTempFile(
          String prefix,  String suffix, 
          File directory)
  public boolean mkdir()
  public boolean mkdirs()
  public boolean renameTo(File dest)
  public boolean setLastModified(long time)
  public boolean setReadOnly()

java.io.ObjectInputStream
  protected final boolean 
    enableResolveObject(boolean enable);

java.io.ObjectOutputStream
  protected final boolean 
    enableReplaceObject(boolean enable)

java.io.ObjectInputStream
  protected ObjectInputStream()

java.io.ObjectOutputStream
  protected ObjectOutputStream()

java.io.RandomAccessFile
  RandomAccessFile(String name, String mode)
      (where mode is "rw")

java.lang.Class
  public static Class forName(
     String name, boolean initialize, 
     ClassLoader loader)

java.lang.Class
  public ClassLoader getClassLoader()

java.lang.Class
  public Class[] getDeclaredClasses()
  public Field[] getDeclaredFields()
  public Method[] getDeclaredMethods()
  public Constructor[] 
    getDeclaredConstructors()
  public Field getDeclaredField(
                       String name)
  public Method getDeclaredMethod(...)
  public Constructor 
    getDeclaredConstructor(...)

java.lang.Class
  public Class[] getClasses()
  public Field[] getFields()
  public Method[] getMethods()
  public Constructor[] getConstructors()
  public Field getField(String name)
  public Method getMethod(...)
  public Constructor getConstructor(...)

java.lang.Class
   public ProtectionDomain 
            getProtectionDomain()

java.lang.ClassLoader
  ClassLoader()
  ClassLoader(ClassLoader parent)

java.lang.ClassLoader
  public static ClassLoader 
           getSystemClassLoader()
  public ClassLoader getParent()

java.lang.Runtime
  public Process exec(String command)
  public Process exec(String command, 
                      String envp[])
  public Process exec(String cmdarray[])
  public Process exec(String cmdarray[], 
                      String envp[])

java.lang.Runtime
  public void exit(int status)
  public static void 
      runFinalizersOnExit(boolean value)
java.lang.System
  public static void exit(int status)
  public static void 
      runFinalizersOnExit(boolean value)

java.lang.Runtime
  public void addShutdownHook(Thread hook)
  public boolean removeShutdownHook(Thread hook)

java.lang.Runtime
  public void load(String lib)
  public void loadLibrary(String lib)
java.lang.System
  public static void load(String filename)
  public static void loadLibrary(
                          String libname)

java.lang.SecurityManager methods

java.lang.System
  public static Properties 
      getProperties()
  public static void 
      setProperties(Properties props)

java.lang.System
  public static String 
      getProperty(String key)
  public static String 
      getProperty(String key, String def)

java.lang.System
  public static void setIn(InputStream in)
  public static void setOut(PrintStream out)
  public static void setErr(PrintStream err)

java.lang.System
  public static String 
    setProperty(String key, String value)

java.lang.System
  public static synchronized void 
    setSecurityManager(SecurityManager s)

java.lang.Thread
  public ClassLoader getContextClassLoader()

java.lang.Thread
  public void setContextClassLoader
                      (ClassLoader cl)

java.lang.Thread
  public final void checkAccess()
  public void interrupt()
  public final void suspend()
  public final void resume()
  public final void setPriority
                     (int newPriority)
  public final void setName(String name)
  public final void setDaemon(boolean on)

java.lang.Thread
  public static int 
      enumerate(Thread tarray[])

java.lang.Thread
  public final void stop()

java.lang.Thread
  public final synchronized void 
                    stop(Throwable obj)

java.lang.Thread
  Thread()
  Thread(Runnable target)
  Thread(String name)
  Thread(Runnable target, String name)

java.lang.ThreadGroup
  ThreadGroup(String name)
  ThreadGroup(ThreadGroup parent, 
              String name)

java.lang.Thread
  Thread(ThreadGroup group, ...)

java.lang.ThreadGroup
  public final void checkAccess()
  public int enumerate(Thread list[])
  public int enumerate(Thread list[],
      boolean recurse)
  public int enumerate(ThreadGroup list[])
  public int enumerate(ThreadGroup list[],
      boolean recurse)
  public final ThreadGroup getParent()
  public final void 
      setDaemon(boolean daemon)
  public final void setMaxPriority(int pri)
  public final void suspend()
  public final void resume()
  public final void destroy()

java.lang.ThreadGroup
  public final void interrupt()

java.lang.ThreadGroup
  public final void stop()

java.lang.reflect.AccessibleObject
  public static void setAccessible(...)
  public void setAccessible(...)

java.net.Authenticator
  public static PasswordAuthentication
       requestPasswordAuthentication(
             InetAddress addr,
             int port,
             String protocol,
             String prompt,
             String scheme)

java.net.Authenticator
  public static void 
      setDefault(Authenticator a)

java.net.MulticastSocket
  public void 
      joinGroup(InetAddress mcastaddr)
  public void 
      leaveGroup(InetAddress mcastaddr)

java.net.DatagramSocket
  public void send(DatagramPacket p)

java.net.MulticastSocket
  public synchronized void 
      send(DatagramPacket p, byte ttl)

java.net.InetAddress
  public String getHostName()
  public static InetAddress[]
                  getAllByName(String host)
  public static InetAddress getLocalHost()

java.net.DatagramSocket
  public InetAddress getLocalAddress()

java.net.ServerSocket
  ServerSocket(...)

java.net.DatagramSocket
  DatagramSocket(...)

java.net.MulticastSocket
  MulticastSocket(...)

java.net.ServerSocket
  public Socket accept()
  protected final void implAccept(Socket s)

java.net.ServerSocket
  public static synchronized void 
      setSocketFactory(...)

java.net.Socket
  public static synchronized void
      setSocketImplFactory(...)

java.net.URL
  public static synchronized void
      setURLStreamHandlerFactory(...)

 java.net.URLConnection
   public static synchronized void
      setContentHandlerFactory(...)
   public static void 
      setFileNameMap(FileNameMap map)

java.net.HttpURLConnection
   public static void 
       setFollowRedirects(boolean set)

java.rmi.activation.ActivationGroup
  public static synchronized
        ActivationGroup createGroup(...)
  public static synchronized void 
      setSystem(ActivationSystem system)

java.rmi.server.RMISocketFactory
   public synchronized static void
      setSocketFactory(...)

java.net.Socket
  Socket(...)

java.net.DatagramSocket
  public synchronized void 
      receive(DatagramPacket p)

java.net.URL
  URL(...)

java.net.URLClassLoader
  URLClassLoader(...)

java.security.AccessControlContext
  public AccessControlContext(AccessControlContext acc,
                                DomainCombiner combiner)
  public DomainCombiner getDomainCombiner()

java.security.Identity
  public void addCertificate(...)

java.security.Identity
  public void removeCertificate(...)

java.security.Identity
  public void setInfo(String info)

java.security.Identity
  public void setPublicKey(PublicKey key)

java.security.Identity
  public String toString(...)

java.security.IdentityScope
  protected static void setSystemScope()

java.security.Permission
  public void checkGuard(Object object) 

java.security.Policy
  public static Policy getPolicy()

java.security.Policy
  public static void 
      setPolicy(Policy policy)

java.security.Policy
  public static Policy 
      getInstance(String type, SpiParameter params)
      getInstance(String type, SpiParameter params, String provider)
      getInstance(String type, SpiParameter params, Provider provider)
      

java.security.Provider
  public synchronized void clear()

java.security.Provider
  public synchronized Object 
      put(Object key, Object value)

java.security.Provider
  public synchronized Object 
      remove(Object key)

java.security.SecureClassLoader
  SecureClassLoader(...)

java.security.Security
  public static void getProperty(String key)

java.security.Security
  public static int 
      addProvider(Provider provider)
  public static int 
      insertProviderAt(Provider provider,
                       int position);

java.security.Security
  public static void 
      removeProvider(String name)

java.security.Security
  public static void 
    setProperty(String key, String datum)

java.security.Signer
  public PrivateKey getPrivateKey()

java.security.Signer
  public final void 
      setKeyPair(KeyPair pair) 

java.sql.DriverManager
  public static synchronized void 
      setLogWriter(PrintWriter out) 

java.sql.DriverManager
  public static synchronized void 
      setLogStream(PrintWriter out) 

java.util.Locale
  public static synchronized void 
            setDefault(Locale newLocale)

java.util.zip.ZipFile
  ZipFile(String name)

javax.security.auth.Subject
    public static Subject getSubject(final AccessControlContext acc)

javax.security.auth.Subject
    public void setReadOnly()

javax.security.auth.Subject
    public static Object doAs(final Subject subject,
                                final PrivilegedAction action)

javax.security.auth.Subject
    public static Object doAs(final Subject subject,
                                final PrivilegedExceptionAction action)
        throws java.security.PrivilegedActionException

javax.security.auth.Subject
    public static Object doAsPrivileged(final Subject subject,
                                final PrivilegedAction action,
                                final AccessControlContext acc)

javax.security.auth.Subject
    public static Object doAsPrivileged(final Subject subject,
                                final PrivilegedExceptionAction action,
                                final AccessControlContext acc)
        throws java.security.PrivilegedActionException

javax.security.auth.SubjectDomainCombiner
    public Subject getSubject()

javax.security.auth.SubjectDomainCombiner
    public Subject getSubject()

javax.security.auth.login.LoginContext
    public LoginContext(String name)
        throws LoginException

javax.security.auth.login.LoginContext
    public LoginContext(String name,
                        Subject subject)
         throws LoginException

javax.security.auth.login.LoginContext
    public LoginContext(String name,
                        CallbackHandler callbackHandler)
         throws LoginException

javax.security.auth.login.LoginContext
    public LoginContext(String name,
                        Subject subject,
                        CallbackHandler callbackHandler)
         throws LoginException

javax.security.auth.login.Configuration
    public static Configuration getConfiguration()

javax.security.auth.login.Configuration
    public static void setConfiguration(Configuration configuration)

javax.security.auth.login.Configuration
    public static void refresh()

javax.security.auth.login.Configuration
  public static Configuration 
      getInstance(String type, SpiParameter params)
      getInstance(String type, SpiParameter params, String provider)
      getInstance(String type, SpiParameter params, Provider provider)
      

java.lang.SecurityManager Method Permission Checks

This table shows which permissions are checked for by the default implementations of the java.lang.SecurityManager methods.

Each of the specified check methods calls the SecurityManager checkPermission method with the specified permission, except for the checkConnect and checkRead methods that take a context argument. Those methods expect the context to be an AccessControlContext and they call the context's checkPermission method with the specified permission.

if (which != Member.PUBLIC) {
  if (currentClassLoader() != clazz.getClassLoader()) {
    checkPermission(
      new java.lang.RuntimePermission("accessDeclaredMembers"));
  }
}

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